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Reforming the contract of UK consultants
Alan Maynard, Karen Bloor
The NHS Plan expressed the intention of government
to “fundamentally overhaul” the national contract for
UK hospital specialists to “reward and incentivise those
who do most for the NHS.”1 How can this be achieved?
Current contract
The current UK pay system for hospital consultants is
a fixed salary with selective bonus payments (distinc›
tion awards), which were introduced early in the exist›
ence of the NHS to reward “excellence.” UK
consultants with a full time NHS contract can
undertake limited private practice (with remuneration
no higher than 10% of their NHS salary); those with a
part time contract (including the “maximum part time”
contract, in which consultants receive 10/11 of a full
time salary) can undertake unlimited private practice.
Criticisms of current contract
Contributing to the renegotiation of consultants’
contracts, the House of Commons Select Committee
on Health published a report aiming “to examine NHS
consultants’ contracts in terms of their accountability,
effectiveness, and efficiency” and to examine the impact
of private practice on the NHS.2 The committee
expressed surprise that “the contract managing the
work of these vitally important professionals remained,
in essence, unchanged since the formation of the NHS
in 1948.”2 In evidence given to the committee, the con›
tract was described as, among other things, “the
ineffective hand in hand with the inequitable” (Profes›
sor John Yates) and “the worst of all worlds” (the BMA).
The existing contract for consultants has several
drawbacks. There is a general absence of information,
which limits accountability and fosters the general
public’s perception that, whereas junior doctors work
an 80 hour week, consultants spend too much time in
plush private clinics and on the golf course. Although
many consultants exceed their contractual commit›
ments, lack of information and the conflict of interest
implied by consultants working in both the public and
private sectors, mean that this stereotype is difficult to
dispel. In addition, NHS purchasers have limited lever›
age on consultants’ activity to meet local priorities. In
future, with the devolution of purchasing to primary
care trusts, general practitioners may expect greater
responsiveness from consultants to their patients’
needs.
The select committee’s report criticised the absence
of information about consultants’ activity; the apparent
wide and unexplained variation in the level of fixed
commitments; the high level of fixed commitments not
fulfilled by consultants; the lack of information on flex›
ible commitments; the inadequate use of job plans and
appraisal; and perverse incentives introduced by
private practice.2 The committee’s recommendations
included systematic collection of activity data for
consultants in the NHS and in the independent sector;
more rigorous monitoring of the “10% rule” governing
full time NHS consultants’ earnings; and a long term
objective that consultants in the NHS should not
undertake private practice.
Requirements of a new contract
The NHS Plan is rather vague about how the contract
will be reformed. It is proposed that all new consultants
should be full time in the NHS for seven years (later to
be reduced to five years)—a form of indentured
contract whereby the NHS gets a return on the public
investment in consultants’ training. Also there may be a
system of bonuses for those who work primarily for the
NHS and at high levels of activity.
Summary points
The contract for UK hospital consultants has
been criticised by the BMA, the House of
Commons Select Committee on Health, and the
current government
It has failed to deliver consistent activity and
accountability in both the NHS and the private
sector
If the NHS Plan is to be carried out, existing
variations in performance by consultants have to
be better managed
A new contract could involve a basic salary
supplemented by bonuses and a fee for each
“item” of service
The contract would require appraisal and
management of consultants’ activity
Informed debate about the design of a new
contract is essential, as is its evaluation once it is
introduced
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A new contract must achieve certain objectives.
After over two years of raised expectations about NHS
services, the winter “crisis” of 1999›2000 resulted in a
government pledge of real expenditure increases of a
little over 6% a year for four years. Money alone, how›
ever, solves little. To increase activity it is necessary
either to recruit and retain more practitioners or to
increase the activity of existing staff. In the short term,
recruitment is planned from doctor surpluses overseas,
but this policy cannot alone deliver the service volume
required by the NHS Plan. The government therefore
requires the new contract and reward structure to pro›
vide incentives for increased NHS activity by
consultants.
The contract should also increase the accountabil›
ity of consultants, reduce the conflict of interest implied
by work in both public and private sectors, and
improve management of their activity. For many
decades the NHS has collected data about NHS activ›
ity, but has not used them for management purposes.
Decision makers at all levels of the NHS have
systematically ignored longstanding efforts in the
analysis of these data.3 Analysis of the hospital episodes
statistics dataset shows that activity rates per consultant
have been relatively constant over time and that large
and often unexplained variations exist.4 5 Activity can
and should be monitored centrally and by trust
managers—for example, by including routinely col›
lected data in annual performance reviews of consult›
ants.
The hospital episodes statistics dataset provides
only information on activity in the NHS; it would be
useful to integrate data on private and public activity.
The private sector is in favour of this, partly for the
protection of patients (surgeons would not undertake
procedures in the private sector for which they have
limited experience). Merging data on activity could
also benefit the public sector, ensuring adherence to
contracts and avoidance of “burn out.”
Another government objective for the new contract
is to introduce incentives to achieve policy targets
(such as waiting times for inpatient and outpatient
care). Overall therefore, the challenge faced by those
renegotiating the contract is to raise the quality, activity,
and accountability of consultants and their teams and
to further the achievement of other policy targets. The
pursuit of these different goals simultaneously requires
a contract reform that introduces new incentives by
combining different types of remuneration.
Remuneration
One way of combining new incentives and different
types of remuneration could be to offer consultants a
basic salary plus a fee for each “item” of service and
carefully targeted bonus payments. The salary element
of this package would guarantee a basic income, with
enhancements to reward greater activity. Fees for each
item of service generally encourage increased activity;
they increased general practitioners’ minor surgery
rates after the introduction of the 1990 contract. This
winter, a fee of £6.40 for each influenza vaccination has
had a similar effect on activity.
Fees
The difficulties with a fee per item system are well
chronicled. The first problem is maintaining quality
and ensuring that activity stimulated by fees is effective
and efficient. A second problem is defining and
deriving a payment for each item. Will an item be an
event—for example, a surgical intervention—or an epi›
sode of care? A third problem is that fees can consider›
ably raise activity levels and therefore costs. The 1990
contract for general practitioners rewarded unproved
interventions—for example, annual screening for
people aged over 75 years—and created considerable
budgetary pressure as doctor activity changed rapidly.
Bonuses
The final element of this possible contract would be a
system of bonuses. Bonuses have proved successful in
inducing activity in UK general practice in relation to
achieving target coverage in immunisation and
vaccination and increasing screening for cervical
cancer. If bonuses were paid for having no one waiting
more than 13 weeks for an outpatient appointment or
more than six months for inpatient care, consultants’
responses to such a bonus scheme could facilitate
achievement of targets in the NHS Plan. Such targets
would give consultants a strong incentive to challenge
general practitioners’ referrals and divert them back
into the community, so general practitioners and con›
sultants would have to manage the referral system
jointly .
The UK government is currently negotiating new
bonus systems with the BMA, and these, once in place,
can be related to consultants’ activity and quality of
care. The system of bonuses to be introduced soon
(probably some time this year) could be related to
activity and waiting list performance.
Incentive schemes
If fees and bonus payments were related to care pack›
ages and teams of providers, a central issue would be
the basis on which payments are apportioned.
Payment reform might focus on the activity of the team
and might require alterations in the methods of
payment to all team members, not just doctors. The
possible reward of effective teams through a bonus
scheme over and above basic pay is considered in the
government’s pay review proposals and in the NHS
Plan.1 6 The role of the team in monitoring quality and
The stereotype of the consultant on the golf course is hard to dispel
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activity levels may be considerable.7 If activity and wait›
ing list bonuses are paid to doctors alone, other team
members may limit their cooperation, activity, and
quality control.
Incentive systems are always problematic. A review
of the evidence suggests that employees do respond to
incentive schemes.8 They respond, however, “in sophis›
ticated ways, manipulating the quality or timing of what
they do. These are generally responses that the organ›
isation neither intended nor wanted.”8 Any system of
rewarding consultants or healthcare teams requires
careful design, evaluation, and monitoring to avoid
unwanted results.
Conclusion
If any reform of the contract increased the availability
of consultants in the NHS, would beds, theatre time,
and nursing be available to increase productivity?
Many NHS trusts have severe constraints on bed avail›
ability,9 exacerbated by an increase in “bed blocking”
and by limited availability of support teams for both
urgent and non›urgent procedures. The reform of the
contract, if successful, could lead to practitioners being
idle and frustrated if support teams and facilities are
unavailable.
Contract reform and performance measurement
for consultants is inevitable and an essential part of
clinical governance. Primary care trusts are likely to
establish contracts for integrated episodes of care
(rather than for isolated activities) and use hospital epi›
sode statistics and related outcome and activity data
routinely in management. The pace of reform may be
swift, and its cost is likely to be considerable.10
Evaluation of this social experiment, whatever its form,
is essential, as is informed debate about its design.
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Commentary: To increase consultants’ activity should not be the
main aim
P Hawker
Everyone agrees that the contract for hospital consult›
ants needs to change. For the BMA’s Central Consult›
ants and Specialists Committee the process of getting
into serious discussions about this with the govern›
ment has been deeply frustrating—it first wrote
formally asking to open negotiations in November
1997.
The committee agrees with some of the reasons for
change suggested by Maynard and Bloor. They rightly
observe that the current contract leads to myths and
stereotypes; it is now so ill understood, by consultants
as well as by managers and the public, that debate is
based on prejudice rather than information. A new
contract that defines more explicitly what the NHS can
and cannot expect from consultants will protect the
dedicated and hard working majority from the tide of
innuendo and denigration—often shamefully perpe›
trated by the government itself—that currently
undermines their efforts.
A new contract is also needed because of the
changing NHS and the society it serves. The committee
accepts and welcomes the move towards a service
increasingly delivered by consultants themselves. This
will require different working patterns—more emer›
gency work and perhaps periods of residence on call.
But emergency duties can no longer be grafted on to a
full daytime commitment; they must be scheduled
periods of duty, followed by appropriate time off. If
staff are routinely to work nights and weekends for
most of their senior professional lives their timetable
must also leave space for family and outside interests—
for a civilised life.
The current intolerable workload of consultants is,
however, barely acknowledged by Maynard and Bloor.
Changes in training and juniors’ hours, increasing hos›
pital throughput, pressure to reduce waiting times,
restructuring and political initiatives, shortages of staff
and resources, rising expectations of patients, and the
unaccountable growth in emergency admissions have
all added to the burden. The current contract provides
little protection to individuals against the sense of
professional duty, and the management pressure, to
carry on doing more and more. This is leading to
stress, exhaustion, and demoralisation. It cannot
continue; the new contract will need to be closed, not
open ended.
I cannot therefore accept Maynard and Bloor’s
assessment that the primary aim of the new contract
must be to increase consultants’ activity. Their activity
should be defined more explicitly and planned more
rationally, certainly. Providing the beds and staff to
enable consultants to carry out their existing workload
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would be a good start. But there is no scope to ask peo›
ple to do significantly more—consultants are already
working at least 50 hours a week for the NHS, beyond
the legal limit. This is one reason why the government’s
ill conceived seven year prohibition on private practice
has been so widely condemned—it would not affect the
amount of NHS work done. Nor do I agree that bonus
payments for meeting targets are the way forward. We
have all experienced the distortions in good clinical
decision making caused by undue emphasis on reduc›
ing waiting lists. What motivates professionals is quality
of care; the remuneration system should underpin that
motivation, not introduce incentives to pervert it.
The Central Consultants and Specialists Com›
mittee believes that a new contract can deliver better
quality of care for patients, ensure a reasonable life for
future consultants, and enable managers to plan and
deliver services more effectively. The committee has
recently published some proposals for such a contract
and is calling on the government to enter into discus›
sions about it.
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Asylum seekers and refugees in Britain
Health needs of asylum seekers and refugees
Angela Burnett, Michael Peel
People who are seeking asylum are not a homogene›
ous population. Coming from different countries and
cultures, they have had, in their own and other
countries, a wide range of experiences that may affect
their health and nutritional state. In the United
Kingdom they face the effects of poverty, dependence,
and lack of cohesive social support.1 All these factors
undermine both physical and mental health. Addition›
ally, racial discrimination can result in inequalities in
health and have an impact on opportunities in and
quality of life.2
Refugees’ experiences also shape their acceptance
and expectations of health care in the United
Kingdom.3 Those from countries with no well
developed primary healthcare system may expect hos›
pital referral for conditions that in Britain are treated
in primary care. This can lead to disappointment for
refugees and irritation for health workers, who may
also feel overwhelmed by the many and varying needs
of asylum seekers, some of which are non›medical but
nevertheless affect health. Addressing even a few of
these needs may be of considerable benefit.
Previous studies in the United Kingdom have
found that one in six refugees has a physical health
problem severe enough to affect their life and two
thirds have experienced anxiety or depression.4 5
Disentangling the web of history, symptoms—which
may be minimised or exaggerated for a range of
reasons—and current coping mechanisms requires
patience and often several sessions. Medication should
be as simple as possible.
Physical needs
In a study carried out in the United States, 5% of
Koreans and 15% of Cambodians were found to be
positive for hepatitis B surface antigen.6 In Spain, 21%
of migrants from sub›Saharan Africa were chronic
carriers of hepatitis B7; hepatitis A and meningitis may
be more prevalent, depending on country of origin.8
HIV prevalence is likely to mirror that in the country of
origin, although some refugees may have been placed
at particular risk. (HIV/AIDS will be covered in the last
paper in this series.) Benign tertian malaria may not be
seen until several years after arrival.6
In 1988, 3.4% of refugees arriving in the United
States had tuberculosis.6 In Britain, new arrivals
should be screened for tuberculosis at the port of
entry, but in practice only a small proportion is
screened, and tuberculosis in those who apply for asy›
lum after arrival will not be identified until later. Cur›
rently no screening is carried out at the channel ports
(P Le Feuvre, S Montgomery, personal communica›
tion, 2000), or at cargo ports, where some asylum
seekers may arrive (P Matthews, personal communica›
tion, 2000). Some areas with large numbers of
refugees have set up screening programmes, but their
coverage varies. A study in Blackburn of a sample of
1085 immigrants found 11 cases of tuberculosis at the
Summary points
Asylum seekers and refugees are not a
homogeneous group of people, and have
differing experiences and expectations of health
and of health care
Symptoms of psychological distress are
common, but do not necessarily signify mental
illness
Trained interpreters or advocates, rather than
family members or friends, should be used
wherever possible if language is not shared
Community organisations provide invaluable
support and can reduce the isolation experienced
by so many refugees
Particular difficulties which face women are often
not acknowledged
Support for children, especially unaccompanied
minors, needs to be multifaceted, aiming to
provide as normal a life as possible
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